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In an effort to meet the challenges of the post-health reform 
marketplace, hospitals have accelerated the practice of 
employing physicians. Despite this trend, many hospitals require 
their employed physicians to also maintain membership and 
privileges on the medical staff—the self-governing entity 
comprised of fellow physicians that oversees the practice of 
medicine within the hospital setting. Recent case law identifies at 
least two salient issues that will likely arise from physicians’ 
dual roles as hospital employee and medical staff member and 
be a point of negotiation and litigation: (1) the applicability of 
“due process” rights, which are typically afforded in medical 
staff peer review actions, to employment termination actions, 
and (2) the obligation to report employment termination actions 
to the federal government’s National Practitioner Data Bank, a 
central database for information about medical staff peer review 
actions and other incidents that may reflect on physicians’ 
competence and quality of care. This article examines how and 
why these issues may become points of contention and proposes 
various practical solutions to avoiding or mitigating such 
conflicts. 
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Five years after passage of the federal Affordable Care Act (ACA),1 
hospital employment of physicians remains one of the most frequently 
cited strategies for hospitals and physicians to meet the challenges of the 
post-health reform marketplace. Many health industry analysts opine that 
the employment relationship offers a template for hospitals and 
physicians to align their operations and financial interests and thus 
position themselves to meet greater demand for high-quality, cost-
efficient care, as reflected in various initiatives in the ACA, such as its 
Medicare reform measure involving “accountable care organizations” 
(ACOs).2 Although the full impact of hospital employment of physicians 
is unseen, one observation is readily apparent: The increase in hospital 
employment of physicians further hastens the demise of the voluntary 
medical staff model—the traditional paradigm of hospital-physician 
relations.3 
Under the voluntary medical staff model, private-practice physicians, 
aggregated together as the medical staff, operate on a mostly independent 
basis within a hospital’s confines, subject to the rules in the medical 
staff’s bylaws and administrative oversight by the hospital’s governing 
body. By definition, the employment model confers hospitals with a 
degree of control over physicians—control they would not otherwise 
have under the voluntary medical staff model. Nevertheless, many 
hospitals preserve the traditional medical staff structure and require their 
employed physicians to also maintain membership and privileges on the 
medical staff. This overlap naturally invites questions about the 
                                                                                                             
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
2 See EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, REINVENTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 224–30 (2014) 
(discussing Medicare-participating ACOs). 
3 See Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Hospital-Physician Relations: Two Tracks and the 
Decline of the Voluntary Medical Staff Model, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1305, 1311–12 (2008). 
2015] HOSPITAL-PHYSICIAN EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION 427 
 
interrelationship between the physician’s roles as hospital employee and 
as member of the hospital’s medical staff.4 
For all its potential, the continued growth of hospital employment of 
physicians will inevitably bring with it a greater share of relationships 
that do not work out and end in termination. Recent case law identifies at 
least two salient issues that will likely be a point of negotiation and 
litigation regarding physician employment arrangements: (1) the 
applicability of “due process” rights, which are typically afforded in 
medical staff peer review actions, to employment termination actions, 
and (2) the obligation to report employment termination actions to the 
federal government’s National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), a central 
database for information about medical staff peer review actions and 
other incidents that may reflect on physicians’ competence and quality of 
care.5 These issues have long been major points of contention within 
medical staff peer review law, but the overlay of the employment 
relationship on the medical staff affiliation requires looking at them 
anew. 
This article examines how and why termination of a physician’s 
employment with a hospital may trigger conflicts regarding due process 
and NPDB reporting and proposes various practical solutions to avoiding 
or mitigating these conflicts. To put this discussion in context, this article 
begins with an overview of the market forces that are driving more 
physicians to become hospital employees and more hospitals to become 
physician employers. An analysis of the legal disputes over due process 
and NPDB reporting that may emerge from physicians’ concurrent roles 
as hospital employee and medical staff member follows. Finally, this 
article suggests how hospitals and physicians alike can minimize these 
disputes by ensuring clarity and precision in negotiating and drafting 
physician employment agreements and in carrying out termination 
decisions. 
I. THE EVOLVING PHENOMENON OF HOSPITAL EMPLOYMENT 
OF PHYSICIANS 
Physicians have historically enjoyed a level of respect and prestige 
that few others in society command. Such reverence, however, does not 
come free, premised as it is on the notion that, as licensed professionals 
who have undergone years of rigorous training, physicians will always 
act independently in the best interests of their patients, regardless of their 
self-interests or the interests of others who stand to benefit from the 
                                                                                                             
4 See infra Part I. 
5 See infra Part II. 
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patient-physician relationship. Numerous sources of law codify and 
make explicit this implicit promise, as, for example, the doctrine in many 
jurisdictions that prohibits the “corporate practice of medicine” (subject 
to the common exception that hospitals may employ physicians without 
violating this prohibition, as discussed below).6 Likewise, protection of 
physician independence undergirds many laws regulating hospital 
operations, such as state hospital licensing laws and the Medicare 
conditions of participation requiring hospitals to maintain a self-
governing medical staff, which adheres to a set of bylaws.7 
Traditionally, under the voluntary medical staff model recognized by 
law, the local community hospital was the “physician’s workshop.”8 That 
is, the hospital was a place where physicians could access equipment and 
staff to perform procedures and provide services not otherwise available 
in their private offices.9 In exchange, physicians would serve in 
leadership roles on the medical staff and take emergency department call 
coverage, usually without pay.10 For some physicians, contributing their 
time and energy to their affiliated hospital was more than just a work 
requirement; it was a civic duty.11 
As with so many aspects of healthcare delivery and finance, 
however, the nature of hospital-physician relations has not been static. In 
the 1990s, many hospitals acquired large numbers of primary care 
physicians’ (PCPs) practices and employed the physicians, thinking a 
managed care model of capitation payments, based on PCPs acting as 
“gatekeepers” for the rest of the healthcare system, would become the 
national standard.12 For physicians, the uncertainty and lower payment 
rates offered by managed care organizations, combined with the 
generous terms proposed by hospitals, made hospital employment 
enticing.13 But when the capitated model failed to take off as anticipated, 
many hospitals divested their employed primary care practices because 
they were losing money.14 
Although hospitals’ experiences in the 1990s provided a cautionary 
tale, they ultimately did not curb the practice of employing physicians. 
                                                                                                             
6 See infra Part II.A. 
7 See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 482.22 (2014) (requiring hospitals, as a condition to 
participation in Medicare, to “have an organized medical staff that operates under bylaws 
approved by the governing body and is responsible for the quality of medical care 
provided to patients by the hospital”). 
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Indeed, hospital employment of physicians continued into the 2000s, 
during which many hospitals began to employ specialists in addition to 
PCPs.15 Now, more than half of practicing physicians in the United 
States are employed by hospitals or integrated healthcare delivery 
systems.16 With its incentives for hospitals, physicians, and other 
healthcare providers to further integrate themselves in an effort to cut 
costs while improving the quality of their care,17 the ACA has been a 
major contributing factor to the increase in hospital employment of 
physicians in more recent years. One such initiative under the ACA 
involves recruiting ACOs into the Medicare program with the prospect of 
sharing in the cost savings that are anticipated to result from tighter 
coordination among providers and an accompanying reduction in 
duplicative and unnecessary interventions.18 By design, the ACO concept 
is intended to be a flexible one, and, as such, hospital employment of 
physicians is one model that may be conducive to achieving its goals, 
through such measures as “incentive-driven compensation linked to 
productivity and clinical behavior” and reductions in “excess costs 
associated with unnecessary practice variation and unnecessarily 
expensive supplies selected by physicians.”19 Although the ACO 
program and the risk-based payment approaches codified in the ACA 
technically apply only to Medicare and other public payers, they are 
poised to be adopted by private payers as well.20 
While the ACA has no doubt fostered an environment favorable to 
hospital employment of physicians, other, more local factors have played 
an important role, too. For hospitals, employing physicians is, at bottom, 
a competitive measure, allowing them to reinforce their place within an 
existing hospital market or enter into a new one, or preempt competition 
from specialist-owned ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), specialty 
hospitals, and imaging facilities.21 Relatedly, employing physicians may 
                                                                                                             
15 See id. at 1307–08. 
16 Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Sahni, Hospitals’ Race to Employ Physicians—The 
Logic Behind a Money-Losing Proposition, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1790, 1790 (2011). 
17 See generally EMANUEL, supra note 2, at 224–30 (discussing various cost-control 
measures in the ACA). 
18 See id. at 224–28. 
19 Kocher & Sahni, supra note 16, at 1792. 
20 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Better, Smarter, 
Healthier: In Historic Announcement, HHS Sets Clear Goals and Timeline for Shifting 
Medicare Reimbursements from Volume to Value (Jan. 26, 2015), available at http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015pres/01/20150126a.html (noting the creation of the Health 
Care Payment Learning and Action Network, through which the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services “will work with private payers, employers, consumers, 
providers, states and state Medicaid programs, and other partners to expand alternative 
payment models into their programs”). 
21 See Casalino et al., supra note 3, at 1308. 
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allow hospitals to improve their operations by filling a shortage in a 
particular specialty or a gap in emergency department call coverage or 
availability for consultation that would otherwise exist.22 For physicians, 
relinquishing the responsibilities of a private practice and becoming a 
hospital employee promise “more regular work hours and less frequent 
call responsibility, and . . . shelter from an increasingly complex and 
unstable market.”23 In short, hospital employment of physicians can be 
both individually and collectively beneficial. 
To be sure, not all physicians are opting for hospital employment. 
Many physicians have taken the opposite course and become competitors 
with hospitals, increasing their ownership in ASCs, specialty hospitals, 
and imaging facilities.24 For physicians—mostly specialists, often in 
markets that lack a consolidated hospital presence—ownership in these 
facilities enables them to increase their efficiency and profitability by 
providing a narrow range of procedures and reaping the “facility fee” 
payment that hospitals would otherwise receive.25 Accordingly, these 
physicians “may rarely set foot in the hospital.”26 Even private-practice 
PCPs and other physicians whose practice is not procedure-based are 
becoming more detached from their community hospitals, using 
hospitalists (who may be hospital employees) to admit and treat large 
numbers of patients rather than assuming call coverage responsibilities.27 
Thus, as one study concluded, a dichotomy is emerging such that 
“physicians will increasingly choose the path of hospital employment or 
of separation from hospitals, with the two paths coexisting in some 
communities, while one path or the other predominates in others.”28 The 
ramifications of this divergence are not yet fully realized, but it at least 
appears “[t]he voluntary medical staff model, traditionally the foundation 
of physician-hospital relations, [is] entering a period of decline.”29 
II. NAVIGATING TERMINATION-RELATED CONFLICTS ARISING 
FROM THE PHYSICIAN’S DUAL ROLES AS EMPLOYEE AND MEDICAL 
STAFF MEMBER 
For most hospital-employed physicians, the employment agreement 
and medical staff bylaws are the primary authorities that govern their 
                                                                                                             
22 See id. 
23 Id. at 1309. 
24 See id. at 1310. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Casalino et al., supra note 3, at 1310–11. 
28 Id. at 1313. 
29 Id. at 1305. 
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practice within the hospital. In many ways, the hospital employment 
agreement may resemble previous employment agreements to which the 
physician was a party, addressing such matters as compensation, 
benefits, insurance, and scope of responsibilities. Typically, the 
agreement will also require the physician to be a member of the 
hospital’s medical staff and maintain appropriate privileges for his or her 
practice, and to abide by the medical staff bylaws, rules, and regulations. 
Depending on the particular arrangement, the agreement may provide 
that termination of employment will result in automatic termination of 
the physician’s medical staff membership or privileges, or vice versa. 
By contrast, the medical staff bylaws act as a charter that sets forth 
the medical staff’s system of governance and the rights and duties of all 
medical staff members vis-à-vis the hospital governing body.30 The 
requirement to have medical staff bylaws and to ensure certain content 
therein stems from various regulatory sources, including state hospital 
licensing laws, federal conditions of hospital participation in Medicare, 
and rules from accrediting organizations, such as The Joint 
Commission.31 Although courts have held medical staff bylaws to be 
enforceable contracts in some cases,32 they generally have not held them 
to be enforceable employment contracts.33 Nevertheless, reference to and 
incorporation of medical staff bylaws in employment agreements raise 
questions as to how the agreement, bylaws, and the laws underlying them 
interrelate and which controls in the event of a conflict. Having an 
answer to these questions is especially important when the hospital-
physician relationship breaks down and is terminated, and will clarify 
both hospitals’ and physicians’ rights and responsibilities. 
A. The Applicability of Medical Staff “Due Process” Rights to 
Employment Termination Actions 
To appreciate why contentions regarding due process may arise from 
a hospital’s termination of a physician’s employment, it is helpful first to 
understand why the procedures for terminating, suspending, or taking 
other adverse actions against a physician’s medical staff membership or 
privileges are themselves the focus of so many legal disputes. As noted, 
multiple sources of law and regulation govern the organization and 
operation of medical staffs and their bylaws, including the procedures for 
                                                                                                             
30 See KAREN S. RIEGER ET AL., HEALTHCARE ENTITY BYLAWS AND RELATED 
DOCUMENTS: NAVIGATING THE MEDICAL STAFF/HEALTHCARE ENTITY RELATIONSHIP 
§ 1.1, at 2 (3d ed. 2011). 
31 See id. §§ 2.1–2.3, at 5–9. 
32 See id. § 3.3, at 26 nn.17–18 (collecting cases). 
33 See, e.g., Engelstad v. Va. Mun. Hosp., 718 F.2d 262, 267 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting 
that “[s]taff privileges do not establish an employment contract with the hospital”). 
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peer review actions. One such source is the federal Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA).34 To “balance the chilling effect of 
litigation on peer review with concerns for protecting physicians 
improperly subjected to disciplinary action,”35 HCQIA immunizes 
hospitals and their medical staffs from liability for damages resulting 
from a determination that adversely affects a physician’s standing on a 
medical staff, but only if minimum safeguards are in place (usually as set 
forth in the medical staff bylaws) to ensure fairness to the physician.36 
Thus, in lawsuits in which physicians seek damages arising from peer 
review actions (often on contractual, tortious, and statutory theories, such 
as theories of defamation and violation of antitrust laws), the steps taken 
by the medical staff in implementing the action are a significant point of 
analysis because they are the key to HCQIA immunity. 
As a relatively new form of hospital-physician alignment, hospital 
employment of physicians is not subject to the same degree of regulation 
as hospital-physician affiliation through the medical staff.37 To the extent 
the law specifically addresses hospital employment of physicians, it 
usually does so within state law doctrines pertaining to the “corporate 
practice of medicine.” In Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center,38 
the Illinois Supreme Court aptly summarized the corporate practice of 
medicine and its restrictions on employment of physicians: 
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine prohibits 
corporations from providing professional medical 
services. Although a few states have codified the 
doctrine, the prohibition is primarily inferred from state 
medical licensure acts, which regulate the profession of 
medicine and forbid its practice by unlicensed 
individuals. The rationale behind the doctrine is that a 
corporation cannot be licensed to practice medicine 
because only a human being can sustain the education, 
                                                                                                             
34 Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (2013)). 
35 Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, 313 F.3d 205, 211–12 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1994)); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2013) (describing the congressional findings relating to 
HCQIA). 
36 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111–11112 (2013) (limiting damages for “professional review 
actions” where requirements for notice, hearing, and governing standards are met). 
37 Not to be overlooked, employment laws of general applicability, such as anti-
discrimination laws, do impose legal requirements onto the hospital-physician 
employment relationship. These laws, however, are not unique to this type of 
employment relationship. 
38 Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. 1997). 
2015] HOSPITAL-PHYSICIAN EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION 433 
 
training, and character-screening which are prerequisites 
to receiving a professional license. Since a corporation 
cannot receive a medical license, it follows that a 
corporation cannot legally practice the profession. 
The rationale of the doctrine concludes that the 
employment of physicians by corporations is illegal 
because the acts of the physicians are attributable to the 
corporate employer, which cannot obtain a medical 
license. The prohibition on the corporate employment of 
physicians is invariably supported by several public 
policy arguments which espouse the dangers of lay 
control over professional judgment, the division of the 
physician’s loyalty between his patient and his 
profitmaking employer, and the commercialization of the 
profession.39 
Critics contend that the complexities of delivering and paying for health 
care in the modern era have rendered the legal doctrine an outdated relic 
from “when health care was ‘a cottage industry, made up of independent 
professionals operating as solo practitioners.’”40 As the Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) concluded in a report on state laws prohibiting hospital 
employment of physicians: 
[T]he debate over the corporate practice of medicine 
doctrine is an argument over who will control the 
delivery of medical care. This contention focuses on 
whether physicians should make decisions free of 
external constraints or whether outside parties (a hospital 
administrator, for example) should be able to exert 
control over physician behavior.41 
Notably, many states’ corporate practice of medicine doctrine 
includes an exception for hospitals to employ physicians. The rationale 
for this exception differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; where courts 
have taken up the issue, some have reasoned that the public policy 
arguments against the corporate practice of medicine—for example, the 
commercialization of medicine—do not apply to hospitals organized as 
                                                                                                             
39 Id. at 110 (citations omitted). 
40 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE 
PROHIBITIONS ON HOSPITAL EMPLOYMENT OF PHYSICIANS, OEI-01-91-00770, at 2 (1991), 
available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-91-00770.pdf. 
41 Id. 
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charitable institutions, while others have opined that hospital licensing 
acts and other laws expressly allow hospitals to offer medical care to 
patients.42 Likewise, the source of these exceptions varies—be it 
statutes,43 court opinions,44 or state attorney general opinions.45 
Even in these states, however, there may be constraints on the 
manner or circumstances in which hospitals may terminate their 
employed physicians. This is particularly so in states that regulate 
hospital employment of physicians legislatively. For example, in 
Colorado, a hospital statutorily may not “limit or otherwise exercise 
control over the physician’s independent professional judgment 
concerning the practice of medicine or diagnosis or treatment or . . . 
require physicians to refer exclusively to the health care facility or to the 
health care facility’s employed physicians.”46 Violation of this 
prohibition may subject the hospital to regulatory penalties or any 
resulting liability to patients or the physician.47 Moreover, a physician 
who believes he or she has been the subject of such a violation “has a 
right to complain and request review of the matter” pursuant to the 
                                                                                                             
42 Berlin, 688 N.E.2d at 111–112 (discussing cases). A small minority of states still 
prohibits hospital employment of physicians on corporate practice of medicine grounds. 
California is one such state. To achieve the benefits associated with employment of 
physicians, such as greater clinical integration and joint contracting with insurers, 
California hospitals have pursued various approaches tailored to California’s regulatory 
environment. One such approach, for example, involves the operation of clinics by 
medical foundations—often hospital affiliate or subsidiary entities which engage 
physicians on an independent contractor basis to provide professional services and which 
manage the administrative aspects of those physicians’ practices. See DEBRA A. DRAPER 
ET AL., CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., A TIGHTER BOND: CALIFORNIA HOSPITALS SEEK 
STRONGER TIES WITH PHYSICIANS 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/
MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/T/PDF%
20TighterBondCAHospitalsSeekTiesWithDocs.pdf. Another, somewhat similar approach 
entails the structuring of clinics as outpatient hospital departments, where independent 
contractor physicians render their professional services, and the hospital furnishes the 
“necessary infrastructure and support for operating the clinics, including the physical 
space, management, support staff, equipment, supplies, medical records, patient 
registration, and facility billing.” Id. at 4. One analysis of these strategies suggested that 
while they may offer hospitals a proxy for directly employing physicians, they “may 
ultimately add costs to the health care system because of the additional infrastructure 
required to operate them.” Id. at 7. 
43 See infra note 46. 
44 See, e.g., Berlin, 688 N.E.2d at 106. 
45 See, e.g., 1992 Op. Att’y Gen. Va. 147. 
46 COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-103.7(3) (2014). Other states impose similar statutory 
conditions on hospital employment of physicians. See, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
85/10.8(a)(3); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-42; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4-8.1(1); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 63-6-204(f)(1)(A); WIS. STAT. § 448.08(5)(a)(1). 
47 COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-103.7(3); see also, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/10.8(c)–
(d) (containing similar provisions). 
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hospital’s medical staff bylaws or policies, which “shall ensure that the 
due process rights of the parties are protected.”48 From these provisions, 
one can infer that a hospital may not lawfully terminate a physician for 
exercising his or her “independent professional judgment” and that if a 
termination action appeared to be a smokescreen for restricting such 
exercise, the physician would be entitled to minimum procedural 
safeguards to validate the basis for the termination.49 The statute does 
not, however, presume that no one can stand in judgment of an employed 
physician; it implies that any void created by restrictions on hospital 
action will be filled by the medical staff, which, as an independent body 
comprised of other physicians, can review the propriety of a fellow 
physician’s “independent professional judgment.” 
Absent these types of statutory protections, the scope of a hospital-
employed physician’s termination rights will depend on the content of 
the employment agreement and its relationship to the medical staff 
bylaws, as illustrated by the recent Hawaii case of Woodruff v. Hawaii 
Pacific Health.50 In that case, a hospital system terminated a pediatric 
hematologist/oncologist in connection with an investigation of the 
physician’s billing practices.51 Because of violations for false billing 
claims, the hospital system was a party to a corporate integrity agreement 
with the OIG and accordingly had to report to the agency and other 
interested parties overpayments and “material deficiencies” in billing 
practices.52 To comply with Medicare regulations, the system’s billing 
office instituted a policy prohibiting physicians from billing for certain 
invasive procedures performed by a nurse practitioner in the outpatient 
                                                                                                             
48 COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-103.7(7); see also, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/10.8(a) 
(containing similar provisions). 
49 This inference is supported by reference to Illinois’ statute authorizing hospital 
employment of physicians. It contains review procedures that are similar to those under 
the Colorado statute but goes further than that statute by prohibiting “retaliat[ion] against 
any employed physician for requesting a hearing or review” under the statute. 210 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 85/10.8(e). By contrast, although state peer review protection statutes 
generally do not directly regulate hospital-physician employment arrangements, at least 
one court has held that a state statute recognizing the confidentiality of peer review 
proceedings impliedly prohibits a hospital from terminating an employee physician 
because of the physician’s conduct as a peer reviewer of another physician’s care. See 
Yedidag v. Roswell Clinic Corp., No. 34,286, 2015 N.M. LEXIS 51, at *39–41 (N.M. 
Feb. 19, 2015) (holding that New Mexico’s peer review confidentiality statute, N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 41-9-5, which impliedly “prohibits an employer from retaliating against a 
physician who participates in a peer review because the unlawful acquisition and 
utilization of peer review information is a factual prerequisite to such retaliation,” is a 
“mandatory rule of law incorporated into physician-reviewer employment contracts”). 
50 Woodruff v. Haw. Pac. Health, No. 29447, 2014 Haw. App. LEXIS 26 (Haw. App. 
Jan. 14, 2014). 
51 See id. at *1–2. 
52 See id. at *5. 
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hospital setting.53 The plaintiff physician expressed resistance and 
disagreement over the application and interpretation of the policy and, as 
an audit and investigation found, had submitted numerous billing claims 
that did not meet the standards in the policy.54 After disclosing these 
findings to the OIG and offering to accept the physician’s resignation 
(which the physician did not tender), the hospital system terminated the 
physician’s employment.55 The physician’s medical staff privileges were 
unaffected by the termination, but shortly thereafter the chief executive 
officer of the hospital where she practiced suspended them.56 On review, 
however, the hospital’s medical executive committee ruled that the 
suspension was unwarranted and therefore lifted the suspension.57 
Among the various causes of action the physician alleged in 
litigation following her termination, she argued the hospital bylaws 
“were incorporated into [her] employment agreement . . . and therefore 
she was entitled to a hearing before her employment was terminated.”58 
For support, the physician cited her employment agreement, which 
required her to maintain in good standing medical staff membership and 
appropriate privileges, and to comply with the medical staff bylaws and 
all other rules, regulations, policies, and procedures.59 The agreement 
                                                                                                             
53 See id. at *10. 
54 See id. at *11–14. 
55 See id. at *14–17. 
56 See id. at *17. The opinion does not specify the grounds for suspension of the 
physician’s privileges, but the short gap between termination of the physician’s 
employment and suspension of her privileges suggests the underlying reasons for both 
actions may have been the same. 
57 See id. at *17–18. 
58 Id. at *46–47. Where an employer hospital is a public hospital, an employee 
physician facing termination may argue that he or she is owed a pre-termination hearing 
and other procedural rights as a matter of constitutional due process. For instance, in the 
recent case of Winger v. Meade District Hospital, No. 13-1428-JTM, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28234 (D. Kan. Mar. 9, 2015), the employee physician asserted that the employer 
public hospital violated his right to constitutional due process when it revoked his 
temporary medical staff privileges because of a finding of substandard care and then 
subsequently terminated his employment. The court rejected this argument on the ground 
that the medical staff bylaws and employment agreement did not create “a 
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest such that the due process protections 
were applicable . . . .” Id. at *13 (quoting Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. 
Sch., 535 F.3d 1243, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008)). As the court noted, the employment 
agreement explicitly incorporated the bylaws, which “provide[d] that temporary 
privileges, such as those held by [the physician], could be revoked at any time, without 
any procedural rights.” Id. at *16. Thus, even for physicians employed by public 
hospitals, the scope of termination-related procedural rights available to them will 
generally turn on the provisions of the medical staff bylaws and the employment 
agreement, as it does for their private-sector counterparts. 
59 See Woodruff, 2014 Haw. App. LEXIS 26, at *49–50. 
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also provided that loss of medical staff membership was “grounds for 
automatic and immediate termination of employment . . . .”60 
On appeal, the court held that the employment agreement did not 
confer to the physician rights associated with peer review actions under 
the medical staff bylaws.61 To the extent the agreement incorporated 
provisions of the bylaws, it did so one-sidedly, in favor of the hospital 
system; it conditioned the physician’s employment on compliance with 
the bylaws but did not require the hospital system to comply with the 
bylaws.62 Nevertheless, the court went on to note that the hearing 
procedures under the bylaws did “not apply to employment terminations, 
but only to adverse actions relating to staff membership and clinical 
privileges.”63 Although the employment termination “may have ended 
the increased access to hospital facilities [the physician] had as an 
employee,” the court concluded “it did not affect the access to and 
privileges at [the hospital] she enjoyed as a medical staff member.”64 
Suspension of the physician’s privileges did follow her employment 
termination, but she was afforded—and was vindicated by—the medical 
staff review process in that action and did not otherwise challenge it in 
the litigation.65 
As Woodruff shows, while a hearing and other related procedural 
rights may be standard course in medical staff peer review actions, such 
rights are much more likely to be the exception, and not the norm, in 
physician employment termination actions. In those jurisdictions that 
prohibit the corporate practice of medicine, or authorize such practice by 
hospitals, but subject to certain restrictions, hospitals run the risk of 
violating the prohibition—and incurring all the liabilities that come with 
doing so—if they terminate or take other adverse action against a 
physician’s employment as a means to retaliate against or impinge on the 
physician’s independent professional judgment. Otherwise, any 
parameters to a hospital’s ability to terminate a physician’s employment 
must appear in the employment agreement. Woodruff demonstrates that a 
mere citation in an employment agreement to the hospital’s medical staff 
                                                                                                             
60 Id. at *50. 
61 See id. at *51–52. 
62 See id. at *50–51. 
63 Id. at *51–53; see also Bryant v. Glen Oaks Med. Ctr., 650 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ill. 
App. 1995) (making similar observations where a pathologist argued the hearing and 
appellate review provisions in the medical staff bylaws applied to the termination of his 
medical directorship). 
64 Woodruff, 2014 Haw. App. LEXIS 26, at *53; see also Bryant, 650 N.E.2d at 630 
(noting the plaintiff physician’s “fail[ure] to appreciate the distinction between his 
medical staff privileges and his ability to provide pathology services with the free and 
unfettered right to use the pathology laboratory”). 
65 Woodruff, 2014 Haw. App. LEXIS 26, at *53. 
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bylaws is not sufficient to extend the rights therein to employment 
termination actions. If a physician is to receive notice, a hearing, or any 
other rights with respect to termination of employment, the employment 
agreement must enumerate them with specificity. 
B. Reporting Employment Termination Actions to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank 
The availability of a process to challenge medical staff peer review 
actions is important to physicians because it provides a mechanism to 
preserve the status quo and stave off losing, in whole or in part, their 
medical staff membership or privileges. Insofar as a physician is able to 
avail him or herself during such review process, he or she may be able to 
avoid an outcome that, in the longer term, may be even worse than losing 
his or her medical staff membership or privileges at a particular facility: 
a report to the NPDB. As a corollary, one would expect physicians to 
advocate fiercely for a hearing and other rights in employment 
termination actions if the outcome of the action were reportable to the 
NPDB. The question, then, is whether physician employment termination 
actions are, in fact, reportable to the NPDB. 
The NPDB is a creation of HCQIA. Complementing the immunity 
provisions under HCQIA, the NPDB is intended to bolster the integrity 
of the peer review process by “accumulating and disseminating data 
pertaining to adverse peer review actions which have an impact on the 
clinical privileges of physicians and other medical staff members.”66 In 
relevant part, HCQIA requires hospitals and other “health care entities” 
to report to the NPBD “professional review actions” that “adversely 
affect[ ] the clinical privileges of a physician for a period longer than 30 
days.”67 HCQIA’s definition of “professional review action” is 
particularly dense, “but the essence of the definition . . . is that it is a 
recommendation or an action based on an assessment of ‘the competence 
or professional conduct of a physician’ that will have an adverse effect 
on such physician’s clinical privileges or membership/appointment in a 
professional society.”68 
In the context of analyzing reporting obligations regarding physician 
employment termination actions, identifying the potentially reportable 
                                                                                                             
66 RIEGER ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.4, at 16. 
67 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1)(A) (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 60.11(a)(i) (2014). HCQIA 
also requires reporting of a physician’s surrender of his or her clinical privileges “while 
the physician is under an investigation by the entity relating to possible incompetence or 
improper professional conduct, or in return for not conducting such an investigation or 
proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1)(B) (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 60.11(a)(ii) 
(2014)). 
68 RIEGER ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.4, at 10 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (2013)). 
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“professional review action” is an important threshold task. Is the 
employment termination decision itself the potentially reportable action? 
Or, where termination of a physician’s medical staff membership or 
privileges occurs in tandem with termination of the physician’s 
employment, is the termination of the physician’s medical staff 
membership or privileges the reportable action (or both)? The first 
question generally has been overlooked, which is curious considering 
that HCQIA defines “clinical privileges” as not only medical staff 
membership and privileges in the ordinary sense, but also “the other 
circumstances pertaining to the furnishing of medical care under which a 
physician or other licensed health care practitioner is permitted to furnish 
such care by a health care entity.”69 Arguably, this definition is broad 
enough to encompass a physician’s status as a hospital employee as an 
“other circumstance” to render care in the hospital setting, especially in 
light of the fact that so many physicians are opting for employment over 
affiliation as an independent practitioner on the medical staff as the 
“credential” for practicing medicine within the hospital environment.70 
Perhaps it is assumed that because termination of a physician’s 
employment tends to be initiated by hospital administration or human 
resources personnel, the employment termination action is not an action 
performed by what HCQIA describes as a “professional review body” 
engaged in “professional review activity.”71 If these terms referred only 
to medical staff review bodies engaged in medical staff review activity, 
then such an assumption would have support. But HCQIA is not so 
limited; it specifically includes hospitals and their governing body and 
other committees in the definition of “professional review bod[ies]” that 
may conduct “professional review activity.”72 Thus, when one construes 
these terms more robustly, and interprets HCQIA’s definition of “clinical 
privileges” to capture a physician’s employment status in relation to a 
hospital, one could reasonably conclude that HCQIA casts a wide 
enough net to require reporting of physician employment termination 
actions where the action is “based on the competence or professional 
conduct of an individual physician (which conduct affects or could affect 
adversely the health or welfare of a patient or patients) . . . .”73 Because 
termination of a physician’s employment without cause could meet this 
                                                                                                             
69 42 U.S.C. § 11151(3) (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 60.3 (2014). 
70 See supra Part I. 
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 11151(10)–(11) (2013) (defining quoted terms); see also 45 C.F.R. 
§ 60.3 (2014). 
72 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11151(10)–(11) (2013) (defining quoted terms); see also 45 C.F.R. 
§ 60.3 (2014). 
73 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (2013). 
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basis,74 even without-cause employment termination actions could be 
reportable under this interpretation. 
Despite its theoretically broad scope, in practice, HCQIA’s NPDB 
provisions have been analyzed more narrowly to discern whether 
termination of a physician’s medical staff membership or privileges is 
reportable, to the extent it is connected with termination of the 
physician’s employment by a hospital. On this issue, conventional 
wisdom holds that termination of the physician’s medical staff 
membership or privileges is not reportable, at least where the termination 
happens automatically following the employment termination action. 
Proponents of this view have traditionally pointed to a passage in the 
2001 version of the National Practitioner Data Bank Guidebook—a 
compilation of guidelines on reporting to and querying from the NPDB 
published by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) 
within HHS—that describes the example of a hospital that has a “system 
of professional review established under its bylaws” and an 
“employment termination procedure,” the latter of which the hospital 
uses “to end a practitioner’s employment without use of the professional 
review process,” resulting in revocation of the practitioner’s clinical 
privileges.75 According to this version of the Guidebook, a report on the 
revocation of the practitioner’s privileges would be voided “since the 
professional review process had not been followed in terminating the 
practitioner’s privileges” and “[t]he termination was not a professional 
review action.”76 
In April of 2015, HRSA released a much-anticipated updated version 
of the Guidebook, in which the agency essentially reiterated its position 
from the 2001 iteration. The new Guidebook maintains the distinction 
between a “system of professional review established under [a hospital’s] 
bylaws” and an “employment termination procedure,” concluding like 
the 2001 version that as long as revocation of a practitioner’s privileges 
is “not a result of a professional review action,” the revocation is not 
reportable.77 But the Guidebook now clarifies that “if the hospital had 
                                                                                                             
74 See Langenberg v. Warren Gen. Hosp., No. 1:12-cv-175-NBF, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 166183, at *31-32 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2013) (describing the purpose of a without-
cause provision in a physician’s employment agreement as “not to guarantee that no 
cause exists for termination of the contract but, rather, to ensure that each party has the 
ability to unilaterally terminate the contract without the need to state a cause. Such 
circumstances do not foreclose the possibility that the terminating party might have 
reasons for its decision to invoke [the without-cause provision]”). 
75 HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NPDB 
GUIDEBOOK, at F-9 (2001). 
76 Id. 
77 HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NPDB 
GUIDEBOOK, at E-40 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 GUIDEBOOK]. 
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performed a professional review of the practitioner’s privileges as a 
result of the review, the professional review action would have been 
reportable, even if the action started as an employment termination.”78 
This added commentary suggests that a direct connection between an 
adverse privileging action and a finding regarding a practitioner’s 
competence or professional conduct is necessary to give rise to a 
reporting duty; if the privileging action is merely a formality that follows 
from an employment termination action, the privileging action is not 
reportable, even if the employment termination action itself was related 
to the practitioner’s competence or professional conduct. 
In an era of increased employment of physicians, where physicians’ 
employment status and medical staff membership and privileges often 
overlap such that termination of employment will cause automatic 
termination of medical staff membership and privileges, HRSA’s 
continuation of its policy in the 2001 version of the Guidebook should 
come as a welcome development for hospitals and physicians alike. 
Indeed, prior to issuance of the revised Guidebook in 2015, one 
reasonably could have surmised that HRSA might change its 
enforcement posture, as the agency has indicated that underreporting of 
professional review actions by hospitals is the “next compliance 
effort”79; to the extent more physicians are trading traditional medical 
staff affiliation for employment, and such underreporting is attributable 
to hospitals not reporting employment-related actions, physician 
employment termination actions conceivably could have become an area 
of renewed interest for HRSA. 
The risks of litigation that a hospital may assume in not following 
HRSA’s now years-long guidance on reporting employment termination-
related actions are on full display in the recent Pennsylvania federal 
district court case of Langenberg v. Warren General Hospital.80 
                                                                                                             
78 Id. (emphasis added). 
79 See HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (2014), http://www.
npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/reports/2012NPDBAnnualReport.pdf (noting “a robust plan to 
conduct educational outreach activities targeted at specific audiences associated with 
hospital compliance involving querying and reporting to the Data Bank”); see also 
Hospital Reporting—The Next Compliance Effort, THE DATA BANK (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/enews/Aug2012enews.jsp (noting “the next phase of our 
compliance initiative–the Hospital Compliance Effort”). According to HRSA data, at the 
start of 2011, forty-seven percent of hospitals had never reported revoking or restricting a 
physician’s clinical privileges to the NPDB. See Peter Eisler & Barbara Hansen, 
Thousands of Doctors Practicing Despite Errors, Misconduct, USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/20/doctors-licenses-medical-
boards/2655513/. 
80 Langenberg v. Warren Gen. Hosp., No. 1:12-cv-175-NBF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
166183 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2013). 
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Following complaints the physician had raised about patient safety and 
quality of care, the hospital in that case terminated the employment of a 
vascular surgeon only months into the employment, citing the without-
cause provision in the employment agreement.81 Pursuant to the 
hospital’s medical staff bylaws, the physician’s medical staff 
membership and privileges terminated automatically and immediately 
upon termination of his employment.82 A month later, the hospital filed a 
report with the NPDB “stating that [the physician] had been terminated 
because, inter alia, he ‘often lacked civility and was demeaning to 
Hospital staff,’ which had a ‘disruptive and detrimental effect on the 
Hospital’s working environment.’”83 The NPDB report further stated that 
the bases for the report were the physician’s “‘failure to comply with 
corrective action plan,’ ‘abusive conduct toward staff,’ and ‘disruptive 
conduct.’”84 During the course of the physician’s employment, however, 
the hospital never disciplined him for any misconduct or provided him 
with any corrective action plan.85 After submission of the NPDB report, 
the physician struggled to obtain other employment.86 
In the federal lawsuit that ensued, the physician asserted a litany of 
causes of action, all of which were premised on the hospital’s allegedly 
improper filing of the NPDB report.87 Among them, the physician 
asserted three breach-of-contract claims that were rooted in the hospital’s 
failure to afford the physician any procedural rights before reporting to 
the NPDB.88 The governing “contract” for these claims was the 
employment agreement and the bylaws. As to the bylaws claims, the 
physician first argued that the hospital breached by submitting the NPDB 
report despite language in the bylaws stating that automatic termination 
of a physician’s medical staff membership and privileges resulting from 
the expiration or termination of a “contractual relationship” with the 
hospital was not an “adverse action,” which would implicate the fair 
                                                                                                             
81 See id. at *2–7. 
82 See id. at *3. 
83 Id. at *3 (citation omitted). The opinion is not entirely clear as to whether the 
hospital reported the employment termination action or the consequent termination of the 
physician’s medical staff membership and privileges to the NPDB. But the court’s 
characterization of the physician’s legal assertions suggests the hospital reported the 
latter. See id. at *20 (noting the physician “maintains that the Hospital breached the 
Bylaws by treating his automatic termination of staff membership and clinical privileges 
as an ‘adverse action’ for NPDB reporting purposes”). 
84 Id. at *3. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. at *6. 
88 See id. 
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hearing plan in the bylaws.89 Relatedly, the physician contended that the 
hospital breached the bylaws by “failing to afford him due process 
procedures ‘pursuant to a professional review action,’ including notice of 
the charges against him, a hearing at which he could contest the charges, 
and an opportunity to appeal any unfavorable ruling.’”90 With respect to 
the employment agreement, the physician argued that the hospital 
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied therein by 
submitting the NPDB report “in the absence of due process measures and 
after having informed [the physician] that his termination was on a ‘non-
cause basis.’”91 
On a motion to dismiss, the court rejected all the physician’s breach-
of-contract claims. The defect in his first count was that there was “no 
ambiguity in the Bylaws concerning the fact that the automatic and 
immediate loss of clinical privileges and staff membership which results 
from a termination of the physician’s employment contract (as was the 
case here) [wa]s not an ‘adverse action’ giving rise to due process 
hearing procedures.”92 The physician apparently attempted to equate the 
bylaws term “adverse action” with the HCQIA term “professional review 
action”—so as to implicate the HCQIA procedures associated with the 
latter term—but by doing so he necessarily had to look outside the 
“operative contractual document” and therefore could not state a viable 
claim for breach of contract.93 For the same reason, the alternative 
bylaws breach claim “fare[d] no better.”94 As the bylaws were clear that 
termination of a physician’s employment would prompt the loss of his or 
her medical staff membership and privileges, the physician was 
“unwarranted” in his “attempt to infuse meaning into the Bylaws’ use of 
the term ‘adverse actions’ by referencing the HCQIA’s 
definitions . . . .”95 In a similar vein, the court held that the hospital could 
not have violated an implied duty under the employment agreement when 
it exercised its express right to terminate the agreement without cause.96 
Any contention of the physician with the NPDB report that followed 
from the termination was, according to the court, an effort to “(once 
again) conflat[e] [the hospital’s] statutory responsibilities and reporting 
requirements under the HCQIA with its contractual obligations under the 
                                                                                                             
89 See id. at *13–15. 
90 Id. at *7. 
91 Id. at *8. 
92 Id. at *7. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at *8. 
95 Id. 
96 See id. at *10–11. 
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Employment Agreement and thereby graft[ ] additional obligations onto 
the Employment Agreement that do not appear in that document.”97 
Although Langenberg does not speak to whether employment 
termination actions against physicians are reportable to the NPDB, it at 
least shows that the practice of hospitals reporting such actions is not 
unprecedented, even where the hospital did not extend HCQIA’s 
procedural safeguards to the physician who is the subject of the report. 
Like Woodruff, the case further reinforces the primacy of the 
employment agreement and medical staff bylaws in governing disputes 
arising from a hospital terminating a physician’s employment. 
Ultimately, if a physician is to be afforded any procedural rights to 
challenge an action that may generate an NPDB report, the employment 
agreement or medical staff bylaws must ensure that those rights are 
available. 
III. PRACTICE POINTERS 
The success of hospital employment of physicians as a form of 
hospital-physician alignment will turn, in no small part, on the 
contingencies hospitals and physicians have in place to resolve potential 
conflicts. It may seem somewhat counterintuitive and adversarial to 
make issues regarding termination a particular point of focus, but by 
reaching common ground on these issues at an early stage, hospitals and 
physicians can better avoid confusion about their rights and obligations, 
and mitigate the likelihood of disputes escalating like those in Woodruff 
and Langenberg. 
At the outset, hospitals and physicians considering the employment 
model should identify and articulate their negotiating positions on due 
process rights related to termination and where on the continuum they 
can compromise. One might expect physicians to advocate for as many 
procedural rights as they can get, while hospitals, wanting maximum 
flexibility, would push for the opposite. But the negotiation need not be 
so partisan and polarized. One potential middle-ground approach is to 
demarcate rights associated with “with-cause” termination from those 
rights associated with “without-cause” termination. 
As to the former, the parties may consider enumerating the grounds 
for with-cause termination by the hospital to include issues involving 
quality of care or patient safety. If the hospital desires to terminate on 
one of these grounds, it could provide the physician a notice of its intent 
to terminate and an opportunity for the physician to respond in some type 
of review forum. The review forum could be conducted through the 
                                                                                                             
97 Id. at *10. 
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medical staff, as the American Medical Association (AMA) proposes in 
opining on with-cause termination of physician employment agreements, 
with the physician receiving “full due process under the medical staff 
bylaws” and a stay on the termination until after the “governing body has 
acted on the recommendation of the medical staff.”98 Alternatively, the 
review process could be a scaled-down version of a peer review 
proceeding, perhaps entailing a combination of medical staff and hospital 
human resources functions. As one commentator suggests: “[E]ven if a 
full-blown, formal peer review process never occurs, hospitals can at 
least attempt to approximate one by offering a review by the medical 
staff, and some opportunity for physicians to present their sides of the 
story.”99 
Contrary to what they might expect, hospitals could reap a number of 
legal benefits by affording their employed physicians an opportunity to 
challenge a termination action for quality-of-care or patient safety 
concerns. For one, if the process and resulting decision are structured to 
fit within HCQIA’s statutory terms—that is, the outcome is a 
“professional review action” that meets the statute’s notice, hearing, and 
governing standard requirements, taken by a “professional review body” 
during the course of “professional review activity”100—then the hospital 
and review process participants could arguably receive immunity from 
damages. Thus, the hospital could mitigate its liability stemming from 
allegations that a termination action was wrongful or gave rise to other 
contractual or tortious causes of action. Plus, the hospital could much 
more definitively conclude that the termination action was a reportable 
“professional review action.”101 In similar fashion, by conducting review 
                                                                                                             
98 See AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA PRINCIPLES FOR PHYSICIAN EMPLOYMENT § 3(e) (2014). 
99 Susan O. Scheutzow & Sean P. Malone, No-Cause Terminations and Data Bank 
Reports: Does a No-Cause Termination Mean No Lawsuit?, MEDSTAFF NEWS (Am. 
Health Lawyers Ass’n. Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2014, at 7. 
100 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11151(9)–(11) (defining quoted terms) (2013); see also 42 C.F.R. 
§ 60.3 (2014). As with reporting of physician employment termination actions to the 
NPDB, immunity from damages for such actions would turn on a finding that the 
physician’s employment status constitutes “clinical privileges” under HCQIA. See supra 
Part II.B.  
101 See supra Part II.B; see also supra note 100. To be sure, compliance with HCQIA’s 
due process provisions is not a prerequisite to reporting a professional review action. See 
Leal v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of HHS, 620 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that 
42 U.S.C. § 11112, “which sets out standards that professional review actions must 
comply with in order for those who participate in them to be immune from liability for 
money damages in suits brought by disciplined physicians, . . . does not govern when a 
summary suspension, which is a type of professional review action, is reportable”); 
Robert R. Harrison, Reporting the Summary Suspension of Medical Staff Privileges: 
Requirements, Sanctions, and Interpretive Challenges, MEDSTAFF NEWS (Am. Health 
Lawyers Ass’n. Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2015, at 4 (“For NPDB reporting purposes, hospitals 
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activity through bodies that act as peer review committees, the hospital 
could, depending on the applicable state law, privilege from discovery or 
admissibility in litigation the communications and documents that are 
generated during the review process.102 Finally, a review process that 
removes the hospital from directly passing judgment on a physician’s 
provision of medical care could shield the hospital from charges of 
engaging in the corporate practice of medicine.103 
By contrast, negotiating physician rights relating to without-cause 
termination may be more challenging because without-cause termination 
is inherently supposed to be hassle-free. The AMA looks upon without-
cause termination with some skepticism, advising physicians to 
“carefully consider the potential benefits and harms of entering into 
employment agreements containing without cause termination 
provisions” and to ensure that these provisions are not a vehicle for the 
employer hospital to terminate for reasons relating to “quality, patient 
safety, or any other matter that could trigger the initiation of disciplinary 
action by the medical staff.”104 For hospitals, however, the ability to 
terminate a physician’s employment without cause is often critical, 
providing a mechanism “to part ways with allegedly trouble-making 
physicians with no questions asked, without a costly peer review process, 
                                                                                                             
have relied on an underlying HCQIA function—the granting of immunity for 
professional review actions—to support the interpretation that no report is required in the 
absence of a professional review action, but the guidance has not been explicit on that 
point.”). In Langenberg, the physician argued to the contrary—that, by deeming 
automatic revocation of a physician’s privileges following termination of an employment 
agreement with the hospital as outside the ambit of an “adverse action” subject to a 
hearing, the hospital’s medical staff bylaws expressed the position that such revocations 
lack the indicia of a “professional review action” that satisfies the procedural standards 
for immunity under HCQIA and therefore were not reportable to the NPDB. See 
Langenberg, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166183, at *15–22. The court did not rule on the merits of 
whether the hospital properly reported to the NPDB, instead limiting its conclusion only 
to the determination that the hospital did not breach the terms of the medical staff bylaws 
by making the report. See id. at *20–22. The ruling leaves open the possibility that the 
physician could initiate HCQIA’s administrative procedures for challenging the 
substance of the hospital’s NPDB report. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.16 (2014) (enumerating 
procedures for disputing the accuracy of NPDB information). Indeed, it appears the 
physician did take this course, as the court later stayed the proceeding while the physician 
moved forward with an administrative proceeding and subsequent district court action 
against HHS involving the NPDB report. See Langenberg v. Papalia, Civil Action No. 
12-175 Erie, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133941 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2014). 
102 See RIEGER ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.4, at 9 n.12 (collecting state statutes). Federal 
law, however, would provide no analogous peer review privilege. See, e.g., Agster v. 
Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that HCQIA “granted 
immunity to participants in medical peer reviews, but did not privilege the report 
resulting from the process”). 
103 See supra Part II.A. 
104 AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA PRINCIPLES FOR PHYSICIAN EMPLOYMENT § 3(f) (2014). 
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and without having to make a [NPDB] report that can generate lawsuits 
for defamation, interference with business relationships, or bad-faith peer 
review.”105 
Short of scrapping without-cause termination rights altogether, there 
are a number of aspects of the without-cause termination provision that 
hospitals and physicians could negotiate. The period of any notice prior 
to such termination would be an obvious target. Linkage of the 
physician’s employment status with his or her medical staff membership 
and privileges—such that termination of the employment triggers 
termination of the physician’s medical staff membership and 
privileges—may be another point of deliberation. As a practical matter, a 
physician’s medical staff membership and privileges may be meaningless 
after termination of employment, but by decoupling them from the 
physician’s employment status, the hospital could effectively put the 
physician on notice that his or her employment status and medical staff 
affiliation are distinct and that termination of employment will implicate 
only those rights under the employment agreement.  
Severing the connection between the physician’s employment status 
and medical staff affiliation could also ward off the quandary of the 
hospital having to determine whether to report to the NPDB termination 
of the physician’s medical staff membership and privileges automatically 
occurring because of termination of the physician’s employment.106 Even 
in those arrangements where the physician’s medical staff membership 
and privileges and employment status remain synchronized, the parties 
could bargain for a representation that the hospital will not report to the 
NPDB an automatic termination of the physician’s medical staff 
membership or privileges. While it is generally correct, as the hospital 
argued in Langenberg, that a hospital’s “reporting requirements under 
the HCQIA are not a matter that could be altered, waived, or otherwise 
bargained away through a contractual arrangement between [a h]ospital 
and a physician,”107 HRSA’s guidance in the Guidebook suggests that 
such a representation would be acceptable because the automatic 
termination of the physician’s medical staff membership or privileges 
would not be a “professional review action” that would implicate the 
statute.108 
Ultimately, whatever terms the parties agree to, they should make 
sure to draft them with precision in the employment agreement. This may 
seem like an obvious point, but it warrants emphasis given the 
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“[m]ultiple layers of contractual relationship between the parties . . . .”109 
References to the medical staff bylaws and related rules, regulations, 
policies, and procedures will be particularly important and should prompt 
review of the specific documents or provisions being referenced and 
determination of whether they track the terminology from relevant laws, 
such as HCQIA (as was not the case in Langenberg, to the physician’s 
detriment). Uses of “[l]anguage such as making the employment 
agreement ‘subject to,’ ‘except as otherwise stated,’ or ‘except as 
otherwise permitted’ by the bylaws” may create the situation, 
intentionally or unintentionally “where the terms of the employment 
agreement are superseded.”110 Yet, as Woodruff cautions physicians, 
even broadly worded requirements in the employment agreement for the 
physician to comply with the medical staff bylaws are generally 
insufficient, on their own, to render the procedures for medical staff peer 
review actions applicable to employment-based actions.111 
Finally, the impetus is on hospitals to think through the propriety and 
consequences of terminating a physician’s employment before doing so. 
Termination is a drastic measure, and as such, it may not be the 
appropriate response to remediate a problem with a physician. 
Particularly where a hospital has clinical concerns, the hospital may find 
that the medical staff framework—with all the corrective action powers 
at the medical staff’s disposal, such as the authority to convene 
investigative committees and subject a physician with deficiencies to 
peer supervision—may be more conductive to resolving the problem. As 
noted, moreover, going the medical staff route may have the added 
benefits of ensuring certain legal protections are in place and accruing 
physician buy-in toward the employment model. On the other hand, a 
quick, clean severance may sometimes be appropriate, such as where the 
physician is creating a disruption for other staff. Termination of the 
physician’s employment, potentially along with the physician’s medical 
staff membership and privileges, may be proper then. 
In addition to the operational factors that will shape employment 
termination decisions, larger market forces will also critically affect the 
contentiousness of these decisions. For physicians in the post-health 
reform system, “it will be harder to revert to private practice if 
relationships sour, since new payment structures and care models will 
make it increasingly difficult for traditional private practices to remain 
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profitable.”112 Indeed, “[e]mployment choices that physicians make 
today may not be able to be undone.”113 Acknowledging this reality, 
hospitals should likely anticipate more challenges to their employment 
termination decisions, leading to the types of assertions in Woodruff and 
Langenberg that various procedures must be exhausted before the 
termination decision can take effect. As a spillover effect for hospitals, 
messy employment termination actions could undermine among already 
employed physician staff the very sense of collaboration and 
coordination that the employment relationship is meant to engender, and 
deter employment of other physicians. Clearly, termination of the 
hospital-physician employment relationship is not a matter to be taken 
lightly.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Hospital employment of physicians continues to take further root in 
the healthcare landscape, yet the voluntary medical staff structure 
remains intact. Hospitals and physicians accordingly will have to 
confront questions about the physician’s dual roles as hospital employee 
and medical staff member, and the rights and responsibilities that attach 
to one role and carry over to the other. The pre-employment negotiation 
will be the best opportunity for the parties to sort through and reach 
consensus on these issues, including the applicability of traditional peer 
review protections in the medical staff context to employment 
termination actions and the duty to report such actions to the NPDB. 
Although the employment model is intended to give hospitals greater 
flexibility and control of physicians’ practice, hospitals are well advised 
to consider some type of pre-termination review process for their 
employed physicians, particularly in circumstances that involve clinical 
practice issues. Doing so could have a number of longer-term legal 
advantages and shore up goodwill among physicians. Once they have 
agreed to a set of terms, the parties should draft them carefully in writing 
in the employment agreement, avoiding vague, overly broad references 
to extra-contractual documents, such as the medical staff bylaws, which 
could muddle the parties’ understanding about which document 
supersedes the others. If and when the time comes to terminate a 
physician’s employment, hospitals should make sure a thorough 
decision-making process is in place, requiring due consideration of the 
reasons for the termination; any available alternatives, including 
disciplinary action initiated through the medical staff; and the risks of 
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liability. Taken together, these steps could go a long way toward 
facilitating the spirit of partnership the hospital-physician employment 
model is supposed to promote. 
